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Abstract
Partial-monitoring games constitute a mathematical framework for sequential decision making problems
with imperfect feedback: The learner repeatedly chooses an action, the opponent responds with an outcome,
and then the learner suffers a loss and receives a feedback signal, both of which are fixed functions of
the action and the outcome. The goal of the learner is to minimize his total cumulative loss. We make
progress towards the classification of these games based on their minimax expected regret. Namely, we
classify almost all games with two outcomes and a finite number of actions: We show that their minimax
expected regret is either zero, Θ˜(
√
T ), Θ(T 2/3), or Θ(T ), and we give a simple and efficiently computable
classification of these four classes of games. Our hope is that the result can serve as a stepping stone toward
classifying all finite partial-monitoring games.
Keywords: Online algorithms, Online learning, Imperfect feedback, Regret analysis
1. Introduction
Partial-monitoring games constitute a mathematical framework for sequential decision making prob-
lems with imperfect feedback. They arise as a natural generalization of many sequential decision making
problems with full or partial feedback such as learning with expert advice [2, 3, 4], the multi-armed bandit
problem [5, 6, 7], label efficient prediction [8, 9], dynamic pricing [10, 11], the dark pool problem [12], the
apple tasting problem [13], online convex optimization [14, 15], online linear [16] and convex optimization
with bandit feedback [17].
A partial-monitoring game is a repeated game between two players: the learner and the opponent. In
each round, the learner chooses an action and simultaneously the opponent chooses an outcome. Next, the
learner receives a feedback signal and suffers a loss; however neither the loss nor the outcome are revealed to
IPreliminary version of this paper appeared at ALT 2010, September 6–8, 2010, Canberra, Australia [1]. This work was
supported in part by AICML, AITF (formerly iCore and AIF), NSERC and the PASCAL2 Network of Excellence under EC grant
no. 216886.
∗Corresponding authors
Email addresses: antos@cs.bme.hu (Andra´s Antos), bartok@cs.ualberta.ca (Ga´bor Barto´k), dpal@cs.ualberta.ca
(Da´vid Pa´l), szepesva@cs.ualberta.ca (Csaba Szepesva´ri)
URL: http://www.cs.bme.hu/~antos (Andra´s Antos), http://www.ualberta.ca/~bartok (Ga´bor Barto´k),
http://www.ualberta.ca/~dpal (Da´vid Pa´l), http://www.ualberta.ca/~szepesva (Csaba Szepesva´ri)
Preprint submitted to Theoretical Computer Science Thursday 25th October, 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
10
2.
20
41
v3
  [
cs
.G
T]
  1
1 O
ct 
20
11
Classification of finite partial-mon. games (Thursday 25th October, 2018 @ 22:29) 2
the learner. The feedback and the loss are fixed functions of the action and the outcome, and these functions
are known by both players. The main feature of this model is that it captures that the learner has imperfect
or partial information about the outcome sequence. In this work, we make the natural assumption that the
opponent is oblivious, that is, the opponent does not have access to the learner’s actions.
The goal of the learner is to keep his cumulative loss small. However, since the opponent could choose
the outcome sequence so that the learner suffers as high loss as possible, it is too much to ask for an absolute
guarantee for the cumulative loss. Instead, a competitive viewpoint is taken and the cumulative loss of the
learner is compared with the cumulative loss of the best among all the constant strategies, i.e., strategies
that choose the same action in every round. The difference between the cumulative loss of the learner and
the cumulative loss of the best constant strategy is called the regret.
Generally, the regret grows with the number of rounds of the game. If the growth is sublinear then the
learner is said to be Hannan consistent1, and in the long run the learner’s average loss per round approaches
the average loss per round of the best action.
Designing learning algorithms with low regret is the main focus of study of partial-monitoring games.
For a given game, the ultimate goal is to find out its optimal worst-case (minimax) regret, and design an
algorithm that achieves it. The minimax regret can be viewed as an inherent measure of how hard the game
is for the learner. The motivation behind this paper was the desire to determine the minimax regret and
design an algorithm achieving it for each game in a large class.
In this paper we restrict our attention to games with a finite number of actions and two outcomes. This
class is a subset of the class of finite partial-monitoring games, introduced by Piccolboni and Schindel-
hauer [19], in which both the set of actions and the set of outcomes are finite.
1.1. Previous Results
For full-information games (i.e., when the feedback determines the outcome) with N actions and losses
lying in the interval [0, 1], there exists a randomized algorithm with expected regret at most
√
T ln(N)/2
where T is the time horizon (see e.g., Lugosi and Cesa-Bianchi [20, Chapter 4] and references therein).
Furthermore, it is known that this upper bound is tight: There exist full-information games with losses lying
in the interval [0, 1] for which the worst-case expected regret of any algorithm is at least Ω(
√
T ln N) [20,
Chapter 3].
Another special case of partial-monitoring games is the multi-armed bandit game, where the learner’s
feedback is the loss of the action he chooses. For a multi-armed bandit game with N actions and losses lying
in the interval [0, 1], the INF algorithm [21] has expected regret at most O(
√
T N). (The well-known Exp3
algorithm [5] achieves the bound O(
√
T N log N).) It is also known that the bound O(
√
T N) is optimal [5].
Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [19] introduced finite partial-monitoring games. They showed that, for
any finite game, either there is a strategy for the learner that achieves regret of at most O(T 3/4(ln T )1/2) or
the worst-case expected regret of any learner is Ω(T ). Cesa-Bianchi et al. [22] improved this result and
showed that Piccolboni and Schindelhauer’s algorithm achieves O(T 2/3) regret. They also gave an example
of a game with worst-case expected regret at least Ω(T 2/3). More recently, Lugosi et al. [23] designed
algorithms and proved upper bounds in a slightly different setting, where the feedback signal is a possibly
noisy function of the outcome or both the action and the outcome.
However, from these results it is unclear what determines which games have minimax regret Θ(
√
T ),
which games have minimax regret Θ(T 2/3) and whether there exist finite games with minimax regret not
1Hannan consistency is named after James Hannan who was the first to design a learning algorithm with sublinear regret for
finite games with full feedback [18].
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belonging to either of these categories. Cesa-Bianchi et al. [22] note that: “It remains a challenging problem
to characterize the class of problems that admit rates of convergence faster than O(n−1/3).”2
1.2. Our Results
We classify the minimax expected regret of finite partial-monitoring games with two outcomes. From
our classification we exclude certain “degenerate games”; their precise definition is given later in the paper.
We show that the minimax regret of any non-degenerate game falls into one of the four categories: 0,
Θ˜(
√
T ), Θ(T 2/3), Θ(T ) and no other option is possible3. We call the four classes of games trivial, easy,
hard, and hopeless, respectively. We give a simple and efficiently computable geometric characterization of
these four classes.
Additionally, we show that each of the four classes admits a computationally efficient learning algorithm
achieving the minimax expected regret, up to logarithmic factors. In particular, we design an efficient
learning algorithm for easy games with expected regret at most O˜(
√
T ). For hard games, the algorithm of
Cesa-Bianchi et al. [22] has O(T 2/3) regret. For trivial games, a simple algorithm that chooses the same
action in every round has zero regret. For hopeless games, any algorithm has Θ(T ) regret.
2. Basic Definitions and Notations
A finite partial-monitoring game is specified by a pair of N ×M matrices (L,H) where N is the number
of actions, M is the number of outcomes, L is the loss matrix, and H is the feedback matrix. We use the
notation n = {1, . . . , n} for any integer and denote the actions and outcomes by integers starting from 1, so
the action set is N and the outcome set is M. We denote by `i, j and hi, j (i ∈ N, j ∈ M) the entries of L and
H, respectively. We denote by `i the i-th row (i ∈ N) of L, and we call it the loss vector of action i. The
elements of L are arbitrary real numbers. The elements of H belong to some alphabet Σ, we only assume
that the learner is able to distinguish two different elements of the alphabet. We often use the set of natural
or real numbers as the alphabet.
The matrices L, H are known by both the learner and the opponent. The game proceeds in T rounds. In
each round t = 1, 2, . . . ,T , the learner chooses an action It ∈ N and simultaneously the opponent chooses
an outcome Jt ∈ M, then the learner receives the feedback hIt ,Jt . Nothing else is revealed to the learner; in
particular Jt and the loss `It ,Jt remain hidden.
In principle, both It and Jt can be chosen randomly. However, to simplify our treatment, we assume
that the opponent is deterministic and oblivious to the actions of the learner. Equivalently, we can assume
that the sequence of outcomes J1, J2, . . . , JT is a fixed deterministic sequence chosen before the first round
of the game. On the other hand, it is important to allow the learner to choose his actions It randomly. A
randomized strategy (algorithm) A of the learner is a sequence of random functions I1, I2, . . . , IT where
each of the functions maps the feedback from the past outcomes (and learner’s internal random “bits”) to
an action; formally It : Σt−1 ×Ω→ N.
The learner is scored according to the loss matrix. In each round t, the learner incurs instantaneous loss
`It ,Jt . The goal of the learner is to keep his cumulative loss
∑T
t=1 `It ,Jt small. The (cumulative) regret of an
algorithm A is defined as
R̂T = R̂T (A,G) =
T∑
t=1
`It ,Jt −mini∈N
T∑
t=1
`i,Jt .
2They used n instead of T and by rate they mean the average regret per time step.
3The notation Θ˜ and O˜ hides poly-logarithmic factors in T .
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In other words, the regret is the excess loss of the learner compared to the loss of the best constant action.
We denote by RT = RT (A,G) = E[R̂T (A,G)] the (cumulative) expected regret. Let the worst-case expected
regret of A when used in G = (L,H) be
R¯T (A,G) = sup
J1:T∈MT
RT (A,G) ,
where the supremum is taken over all outcome sequences J1:T = (J1, J2, . . . , JT ) ∈ MT . The minimax
expected regret of G (or minimax regret, for short) is:
RT (G) = inf
A
R¯T (A,G) = inf
A
sup
J1:T∈MT
RT (A,G) ,
where the infimum is taken over all randomized strategies A. Note that, since RT (A,G) ≥ 0 for constant
outcome sequences, RT (G) ≥ 0 also holds.
We identify the set of all probability distributions over the set of outcomes M with the probability
simplex ∆M = {p ∈ RM : ∑Mj=1 p( j) = 1, ∀ j ∈ M, p( j) ≥ 0}. We use 〈·, ·〉 to denote the standard dot
product.
3. Characterization of Games with Two Outcomes
In this section, we formally phrase our main characterization result. We need a preliminary definition
that is useful for any finite game:
Definition 1 (Properties of Actions). Let G = (L,H) be a finite partial-monitoring game with N actions
and M outcomes. Let i ∈ N be one of its actions.
• Action i is called dominated if for any p ∈ ∆M there exists an action i′ such that `i′ , `i and 〈`i′ , p〉 ≤
〈`i, p〉.
• Action i is called non-dominated if it is not dominated.
• Action i is called degenerate if it is dominated and there exists a distribution p ∈ ∆M such that for all
i′ ∈ N, 〈`i, p〉 ≤ 〈`i′ , p〉.
• Action i is called all-revealing if any pair of outcomes j, j′, j , j′ satisfies hi, j , hi, j′ .
• Action i is called none-revealing if any pair of outcomes j, j′ satisfies hi, j = hi, j′ .
• Action i is called partially-revealing if it is neither all-revealing nor none-revealing.
• All-revealing and partially-revealing actions together are called revealing actions.
• Two or more actions with the same loss vector are called duplicate actions.
The property of being dominated has an equivalent dual definition. Namely, action i is dominated if there
exists a set of actions with loss vectors not equal to `i such that some convex combination of their loss
vectors is componentwise upper bounded by `i.
In games with M = 2 outcomes, each action is either all-revealing or none-revealing. This dichotomy is
one of the key properties that lead to the classification theorem for two-outcome games. To emphasize the
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`·,2
`·,1
i3
i2
i1
i4
Revealing non-dominated action
Non-revealing non-dominated action
Dominated action (revealing or non-revealing)
Figure 1: The figure shows each action i as a point in R2 with coordinates (`i,1, `i,2). The solid line connects the chain of non-
dominated actions, which, by convention are ordered according to their loss for the first outcome.
dichotomy, from now on we will refer to them as revealing and non-revealing whenever it is clear from the
context that M = 2.
The above property also allows us to assume without of loss generality that there are no duplicate
actions. Clearly, if multiple actions with the same loss vector exist, all but one can be removed (together
with the corresponding rows of L and H) without changing the minimax regret: If all of them are non-
revealing, we keep one of the actions and remove all the others. Otherwise, we keep a revealing action
and remove the others. Then replacing any algorithm by one that, instead of a removed action, chooses
always the corresponding kept action, its loss cannot increase and equals to the loss of this algorithm for the
original game. So the two games have the same minimax regret.
The concepts of dominated and non-dominated actions can be visualized for two-outcome games by
drawing the loss vector of each action as a point in R2. The points corresponding to the non-dominated
actions lie on the bottom-left boundary of the convex hull of the set of all the actions, as shown in Figure 1.
Enumerating the non-dominated actions ordered according to their loss for the first outcome gives rise to a
sequence (i1, i2, . . . , iK), which we call the chain of non-dominated actions.
To state the classification theorem, we introduce the following conditions.
Separation Condition. A two-outcome game G satisfies the separation condition if, after removing dupli-
cate actions, its chain of non-dominated actions does not have a pair of consecutive actions ik, ik+1 such
that both of them are non-revealing. The set of games satisfying this condition will be denoted by S.
Non-degeneracy Condition. A two-outcome game G is degenerate if it has a degenerate revealing action.
If G is not degenerate, we call it non-degenerate and we say that it satisfies the non-degeneracy condition.
As we will soon see, the separation condition is the key to distinguish between hard and easy games.
On the other hand, the non-degeneracy condition is merely a technical condition that we need in our proofs.
The set of degenerate games is excluded from the characterization, as we do not know the minimax regret
of these games. We are now ready to state our main result.
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Theorem 2 (Classification of Two-Outcome Partial-Monitoring Games). LetS be the set of all finite partial-
monitoring games with two outcomes that satisfy the separation condition. Let G = (L,H) be a game with
two outcomes that satisfies the non-degeneracy condition. Let K be the number of non-dominated actions
in G, counting duplicate actions only once. The minimax expected regret RT (G) satisfies
RT (G) =

0 (∀T ), K = 1; (1a)
Θ˜
(√
T
)
, K ≥ 2, G ∈ S; (1b)
Θ
(
T 2/3
)
, K ≥ 2, G < S, G has a revealing action; (1c)
Θ(T ), otherwise. (1d)
We call the games in cases (1a)–(1d) trivial, easy, hard, and hopeless, respectively. Case (1a) is proven
by the following lemma which shows that a trivial game is also characterized by having 0 minimax regret
in a single round or by having an action “dominating” alone all the others:
Lemma 3. For any finite partial-monitoring game, the following four statements are equivalent:
a) The minimax regret is zero for each T .
b) The minimax regret is zero for some T .
c) There exists a (non-dominated) action i ∈ N whose loss is not larger than the loss of any other action
irrespectively of the choice of Nature’s action.
d) The game is trivial, i.e., K = 1 (using the definition in Theorem 2).
The proof of this lemma can be found in the Appendix. Case (1d) of Theorem 2 is proven in the
Appendix as well. The upper bound of case (1c) can be derived from a result of Cesa-Bianchi et al. [22]:
Recall that the entries of H can be changed without changing the information revealed to the learner as long
as one does not change the pattern of which elements in a row are equal and different. Cesa-Bianchi et al.
[22] show that if the entries of H can be chosen such that rank(H) = rank
(
H
L
)
then O(T 2/3) expected
regret is achievable. This condition holds trivially for two-outcome games with at least one revealing action
and N ≥ 2. It remains to prove the upper bound for case (1b), the lower bound for (1b), and the lower bound
for (1c); we prove these in Sections 5, 6, and 7, respectively.
4. Examples
Before we dive into the proof of Theorem 2, we give a few examples of finite partial-monitoring games
with two outcomes and show how the theorem can be applied. For each example we present the matrices
L,H and depict the loss vectors of actions as points in R2.
Example 4 (One-Armed Bandit). We start with an example of a multi-armed bandit game. Multi-armed
bandit games are those where the feedback equals the instantaneous loss, that is, when L = H. 4
4“Classically”, non-stochastic multi-armed bandit problems are defined by the restriction that in no round Learner can gain any
information about the losses of actions other than the chosen one, that is, L is not known in advance to Learner. (Also, the domain
set of losses is often infinite there (M = ∞).) When H = L in our setting, depending on L, this might or might not be the case;
the “classical bandit” problem with losses constrained to a finite set is a special case of games with H = L, however, the latter
condition allows also other types of games where the Learner can recover the losses of actions not chosen, and so which could be
“easier” than classical bandits due to the knowledge of L. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that these games are at most as hard as
classical bandit games.
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L =
(
0 0
−1 1
)
, H =
(
0 0
−1 1
)
,
`·,2
`·,1
Revealing non-dominated action
Non-revealing non-dominated action
Because the loss of the first action is 0 regardless of the outcome, and the loss varies only for the second
action, we call this game a one-armed bandit game. Both actions are non-dominated and the second one is
revealing, therefore it is an easy game and according to Theorem 2 its minimax regret is Θ˜(
√
T ). (For this
specific game, it can be shown that it is in fact Θ(
√
T ).)
Example 5 (Apple Tasting). Consider an orchard that wants to hand out its crop of apples for sale. How-
ever, some of the apples might be rotten. The orchard can do a sequential test. Each apple can be either
tasted (which reveals whether the apple is healthy or rotten) or the apple can be given out for sale. If a
rotten apple is given out for sale, the orchard suffers a unit loss. On the other hand, if a healthy apple is
tasted, it cannot be sold and, again, the orchard suffers a unit loss. This can be formalized by the following
partial-monitoring game [13]:
L =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, H =
(
a a
b c
)
,
`·,2
`·,1
Revealing non-dominated action
Non-revealing non-dominated action
The first action corresponds to giving out the apple for sale, the second corresponds to tasting the apple;
the first outcome corresponds to a rotten apple, the second outcome corresponds to a healthy apple. Both
actions are non-dominated and the second one is revealing, therefore it is an easy game and according to
Theorem 2 the minimax regret is Θ˜(
√
T ). This is apparently a new result for this game. Also notice that the
picture is a just a translation of the picture for the one-armed bandit.
Example 6 (Label Efficient Prediction). Consider a situation when we would like to sequentially classify
emails as spam or as legitimate. For each email we have to output a prediction, and additionally we can
request, as feedback, the correct label from the user. If we classify an email incorrectly or we request its
label, we suffer a unit loss. (If the email is classified correctly and we do not request the feedback, no loss
is suffered.) This can be formalized by the following partial-monitoring game [22]:
L =
1 10 1
1 0
 , H =
a bc c
d d
 ,
`·,2
`·,1
Non-revealing non-dominated action
Revealing dominated action
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where the first action corresponds to a label request, and the second and the third action correspond to a
prediction (spam and legitimate, respectively) without a request. The outcomes correspond to spam and
legitimate emails.
We see that the chain of non-dominated actions contains two neighboring non-revealing actions and
there is a dominated revealing action. Therefore, it is a hard game and, by Theorem 2, the minimax regret is
Θ(T 2/3). This specific example was the only game known so far with minimax regret at least Ω(T 2/3) [22,
Theorem 5.1].
Example 7 (A Hopeless Game). The following game is an example where the feedback does not reveal
any information about the outcome:
L =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, H =
(
a a
b b
)
,
`·,2
`·,1
Non-revealing non-dominated action
Because both actions are non-revealing and non-dominated, it is a hopeless game and thus its minimax
regret is Θ(T ).
Example 8 (A Trivial Game). In the following game, the best action, regardless of the outcome sequence,
is action 2. A learner that chooses this action in every round is guaranteed to have zero regret.
L =
2 11 0
1 1
 , H =
a bc d
e f

`·,2
`·,1
Revealing non-dominated action
Revealing dominated action
Because this game has only one non-dominated action (action 2), it is a trivial game and thus its minimax
regret is 0.
Example 9 (A Degenerate Game). The next game does not satisfy the non-degeneracy condition and there-
fore Theorem 2 does not apply.
L =
2 01 1
0 2
 , H =
a ab c
d d

`·,2
`·,1
Non-revealing non-dominated action
Revealing dominated (degenerate) action
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Its minimax regret is between Ω(
√
T ) and O(T 2/3). It remains an open problem to close this gap and
determine the exact rate of growth.
5. Upper bound for easy games
In this section we present our algorithm for games satisfying the separation condition and the non-de-
generacy condition, and prove that it achieves O˜(
√
T ) regret with high probability. We call the algorithm
AppleTree since it builds a binary tree, leaves of which are apple tasting games.
5.1. The algorithm
In the first step of the algorithm we can purify the game by first removing the dominated actions and
then the duplicates as mentioned beforehand.
The idea of the algorithm is to recursively split the game until we arrive at games with two actions only.
Now, if one has only two actions in a partial-information game, the game must be either a full-information
game (if both actions are revealing) or an instance of a one-armed bandit (with one revealing and one
non-revealing action).
To see why this latter case corresponds to one-armed bandits, assume without loss of generality that
the first action is the revealing action. Now, it is easy to see that the regret of a sequence of actions in a
game does not change if the loss matrix is changed by subtracting the same number from a column.5 By
subtracting `2,1 from the first and `2,2 from the second column we thus get the equivalent game where the
second row of the loss matrix is zero, arriving at a one-armed bandit game (see Example 4). Since a one-
armed bandit is a special form of a two-armed bandit, one can use Exp3.P due to Auer et al. [5] to achieve
the O(
√
T ) regret.
Now, if there are more than two actions in the game, then the game is split, putting the first half of the
actions into the first and the second half into the second subgame, with a single common shared action.
Recall that, in the chain of non-dominated actions, the actions are ordered according to their losses corre-
sponding to the first outcome. This is continued until the split results in games with two actions only. The
recursive splitting of the game results in a binary tree (see Figure 2). The idea of the strategy played at
an internal node of the tree is as follows: An outcome sequence of length T determines the frequency ρT
of outcome 2. If this frequency is small, the optimal action is one of the actions of G1, the first subgame
(simply because then the frequency of outcome 1 is high and G1 contains the actions with the smallest loss
for the first outcome). Conversely, if this frequency is large, the optimal action is one of the actions of G2. In
some intermediate range, the optimal action is the action shared between the subgames. Let the boundaries
of this range be ρ∗1 < ρ
∗
2 (ρ
∗
1 is thus the solution to (1 − ρ)`s−1,1 + ρ`s−1,2 = (1 − ρ)`s,1 + ρ`s,2 and ρ∗2 is the
solution to (1 − ρ)`s+1,1 + ρ`s+1,2 = (1 − ρ)`s,1 + ρ`s,2, where s = dK/2e is the index of the action shared
between the two subgames.)
If we knew ρT , a good solution would be to play a strategy where the actions are restricted to that of
either game G1 or G2, depending on whether ρT ≤ ρ∗1 or ρT ≥ ρ∗2. (When ρ∗1 ≤ ρT ≤ ρ∗2 then it does
not matter which action-set we restrict the play to, since the optimal action in this case is included in both
sets.) There are two difficulties. First, since the outcome sequence is not known in advance, the best we
can hope for is to know the running frequencies ρt = 1t
∑t
s=1 I (Js = 2). However, since the game is a
partial-information game, the outcomes are not revealed in all time steps, hence, even ρt is inaccessible.
5As a result, for any algorithm, if RT is its regret at time T when measured in the game with the modified loss matrix, the
algorithm’s “true” regret will also be RT (i.e., the algorithm’s regret when measured in the original, unmodified game). Piccolboni
and Schindelhauer [19] exploit this idea, too.
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v
Child(v, 1) Child(v, 2)
Figure 2: The binary tree built by the algorithm. The leaf nodes represent neighboring action pairs.
Nevertheless, for now let us assume that ρt was available. Then one idea would be to play a strategy
restricted to the actions of either game G1 or G2 as long as ρt stays below ρ∗1 or above ρ
∗
2. Further, when ρt
becomes larger than ρ∗2 while previously the strategy played the action of G1 then we have to switch to the
game G2. In this case, we start a fresh copy (a reset) of a strategy playing in G2. The same happens when a
switch from G2 to game G1 is necessary. These resets are necessary because at the leaves we play according
to strategies that use weights that depend on the cumulated losses of the actions exponentially. To see an
example when without resets the algorithm fails to achieve a small regret consider the case when there are
3 actions, the middle one being revealing. Assume that during the first T/2 time steps the frequency of
outcome 2 oscillates between the two boundaries so that the algorithm switches constantly back and forth
between the games G1 and G2. Assume further that in the second half of the game, the outcome is always
2. This way the optimal action will be 3. Nevertheless, up to time step T/2, the player of G2 will only see
outcome 1 and thus will think that action 2 is the optimal action. In the second half of the game, he will not
have enough time to recover and will play action 2 for too long. Resetting the algorithms of the subgames
avoids this behavior.
If the number of switches was large, the repeated resetting of the strategies could be equally problem-
atic. Luckily this cannot happen, hence the resetting does minimal harm. We will in fact show that this
generalizes to the case even when ρt is estimated based on partial feedback (see Lemma 11).
Let us now turn to how ρt is estimated. As mentioned in Section 3, mapping a row of H bijectively
leads to an equivalent game, thus for M = 2 we can assume without loss of generality that in any round,
the algorithm receives (possibly random) feedback Ht ∈ {1, 2, ∗}: if a revealing action is played in the
round, Ht = Jt ∈ {1, 2}, otherwise Ht = ∗. Let H1:t−1 = (I1,H1, . . . , It−1,Ht−1) ∈ (N × Σ)t−1, the (random)
history of actions and observations up to time step t − 1. If the algorithm choosing the actions decides with
probability pt ∈ (0, 1] to play a revealing action (pt can depend on H1:t−1) then I (Ht = 2) /pt is a simple
unbiased estimate of I (Jt = 2) (in fact, E
[
I (Ht = 2) /pt|H1:t−1] = I (Jt = 2)). As long as pt does not drop
to a too low value, ρˆt = 1t
∑t
s=1
I(Hs=2)
ps
will be a relatively reliable estimate of ρt (see Lemma 12). However
reliable this estimate is, it can still differ from ρt. For this reason, we push the boundaries determining game
switches towards each other:
ρ′1 =
2ρ∗1 + ρ
∗
2
3
, ρ′2 =
ρ∗1 + 2ρ
∗
2
3
. (2)
We call the resulting algorithm AppleTree, because the elementary partial-information 2-action games
in the bottom essentially correspond to instances of the apple tasting problem (see Example 5). The algo-
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function Main(G,T, δ)
Input: G = (L,H) is a game, T is a horizon,
0 < δ < 1 is a confidence parameter
1: G ← Purify(G)
2: BuildTree(root,G, δ)
3: for t ← 1 to T do
4: Play(root)
5: end for
Figure 3: The main entry point of the AppleTree algo-
rithm
function InitEta(G,T )
Input: G is a game, T is a horizon
1: if IsRevealing(G, 2) then
2: η(v)← √8 ln 2 /T
3: else
4: η(v)← γ(v)/4
5: end if
Figure 4: The initialization routine InitEta.
function BuildTree(v,G, δ)
Input: G = (L,H) is a game, v is a tree node
1: if NumOfActions(G) = 2 then
2: if not IsRevealing(G, 1) then
3: G ← SwapActions(G)
4: end if
5: wi(v)← 1/2, i = 1, 2
6: β(v)← √ln(2/δ)/(2T )
7: γ(v)← 8β(v)/(3 + β(v))
8: InitEta(G,T )
9: else
10: (G1,G2)← SplitGame(G)
11: BuildTree(Child(v, 1), G1, δ/(4T ) )
12: BuildTree(Child(v, 2), G2, δ/(4T ) )
13: g(v)← 1, ρˆ(v)← 0, t(v)← 1
14: (ρ′1(v), ρ
′
2(v))← Boundaries(G)
15: end if
16: G(v)← G
Figure 5: The tree building procedure
rithm’s main entry point is shown on Figure 3. Its inputs are the game G = (L,H), the time horizon and a
confidence parameter 0 < δ < 1. The algorithm first eliminates the dominated and duplicate actions. This
is followed by building a tree, which is used to store variables necessary to play in the subgames (Figure 5):
If the number of actions is 2, the procedure initializes various parameters that are used either by a bandit
algorithm (based on Exp3.P [5]), or by the exponentially weighted average algorithm (EWA) [4]. In the
other case, it calls itself recursively on the split subgames and with an appropriately decreased confidence
parameter.
The main worker routine is called Play. This is again a recursive function (see Figure 6). The special
case when the number of actions is two is handled in routine PlayAtLeaf, which will be discussed later.
When the number of actions is larger, the algorithm recurses to play in the subgame that was remembered
as the game to be preferred from the last round and then updates its estimate of the frequency of outcome
2 based on the information received. When this estimate changes so that a switch of the current preferred
game is necessary, the algorithm resets the algorithms in the subtree corresponding to the game switched to,
and changes the variable storing the index of the preferred game. The Reset function used for this purpose,
shown on Figure 7, is also recursive.
At the leaves, when there are only two actions, either EWA or Exp3.P is used. These algorithms are
used with their standard optimized parameters (see Corollary 4.2 for the tuning of EWA, and Theorem 6.10
for the tuning of Exp3.P, both from the book of Lugosi and Cesa-Bianchi [20]). For completeness, their
pseudocodes are shown in Figures 8–9. Note that with Exp3.P (lines 6–14) we use the loss matrix trans-
formation described earlier, hence the loss matrix has zero entries for the second (non-revealing) action,
while the entry for action 1 and outcome j is `1, j(v) − `2, j(v). Here `i, j(v) stands for the loss of action i and
outcome j in the game G(v) that is stored at node v.
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function Play(v)
Input: v is a tree node
1: if NumOfActions(G(v)) = 2 then
2: (p, h)← PlayAtLeaf(v)
3: else
4: (p, h)← Play(Child(v, g(v)))
5: ρˆ(v)← (1 − 1t(v) )ρˆ(v) + 1t(v) I(h=2)p
6: if g(v) = 2 and ρˆ(v) < ρ′1(v) then
7: Reset(Child(v, 1)); g(v)← 1
8: else if g(v) = 1 and ρˆ(v) > ρ′2(v) then
9: Reset(Child(v, 2)); g(v)← 2
10: end if
11: t(v)← t(v) + 1
12: end if
13: return (p, h)
Figure 6: The recursive function Play
function Reset(v)
Input: v is a tree node
1: if NumOfActions(G(v)) = 2 then
2: wi(v)← 1/2, i← 1, 2
3: else
4: g(v)← 1, ρˆ(v)← 0, t(v)← 1
5: Reset(Child(v, 1))
6: end if
Figure 7: Function Reset
5.2. Proof of the upper bound
Theorem 10. Assume G = (L,H) satisfies the separation condition and the non-degeneracy condition and
`i, j ≤ 1. Denote by R̂T the regret of Algorithm AppleTree up to time step T . There exist constants c,p such
that for any 0 < δ < 1 and T ∈ N, for any outcome sequence J1, . . . , JT , the algorithm with input G,T, δ
achieves Pr
[
R̂T ≤ c
√
T lnp(2T/δ)
]
≥ 1 − δ .
Throughout the proof we will analyze the algorithm’s behavior at the root node. We will use time indices
as follows. Let us define the filtration {Ft = σ(I1, . . . , It)}t, where It is the action the algorithm plays at time
step t. To any variable x(v) used by the algorithm, we denote by xt(v) the value of x(v) that is measurable
with respect to Ft, but not measurable with respect to Ft−1. From now on we abbreviate xt(root) by xt. We
start with two lemmas. The first lemma shows that the number of switches the algorithm makes is small.
Lemma 11. Let S be the number of times AppleTree calls Reset at the root node. Then there exists a
universal constant c∗ such that S ≤ c∗ ln T
∆
, where ∆ = ρ′2 − ρ′1 with ρ′1 and ρ′2 given by (2).
Note that here we use the non-degeneracy condition to ensure that ∆ > 0.
Proof. Let s be the number of times the algorithm switches from G2 to G1. Let t1 < · · · < ts be the time
steps when ρˆt becomes smaller than ρ′1. Similarly, let t
′
1 < · · · < t′s+ξ, (ξ ∈ {0, 1}) be the time steps when ρˆt
becomes greater than ρ′2. Note that for all 1 ≤ j < s, t′j < t j < t′j+1. Finally, for every 1 ≤ j < s, we define
t′′j = min{t | t′j ≤ t ≤ t j, (∀t ≤ τ ≤ t j : ρˆτ ≤ 1)}. In other words, t′′j is the time step when ρˆt drops below 1
and stays there until the next reset.
First we observe that if t′′j ≥ 2/∆ then ρˆt′′j ≥ (ρ′1 + ρ′2)/2. Indeed, if t′′j = t′j then ρˆt′′j ≥ ρ′2, on the other
hand, if t′′j , t
′
j then ρˆt′′j −1 > 1 and, from the update rule we have
ρˆt′′j =
1 − 1t′′j
 ρˆt′′j −1 + 1t′′j ·
I
(
Jt′′j = 2
)
pt′′j
≥ 1 − ∆
2
≥ ρ
′
1 + ρ
′
2
2
.
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function PlayAtLeaf(v)
Input: v is a tree node
1: if RevealingActionNumber(G(v)) = 2 then .
Full-information case
2: (p, h)← Ewa(v)
3: else . Partial-information case
4: p← (1 − γ(v)) w1(v)w1(v)+w2(v) + γ(v)/2
5: U ∼ U[0,1) . U is uniform in [0, 1)
6: if U < p then . Play revealing action
7: h← CHOOSE(1) . h ∈ {1, 2}
8: L1 ← (`1,h(v) − `2,h(v) + β(v))/p
9: L2 ← β(v)/(1 − p)
10: w1(v)← w1(v) exp(−η(v)L1)
11: w2(v)← w2(v) exp(−η(v)L2)
12: else
13: h← CHOOSE(2) . here h = ∗
14: end if
15: end if
16: return (p, h)
Figure 8: Function PlayAtLeaf
function Ewa(v)
Input: v is a tree node
1: p← w1(v)w1(v)+w2(v)
2: U ∼ U[0,1) . U is uniform in [0, 1)
3: if U < p then
4: I ← 1
5: else
6: I ← 2
7: end if
8: h← CHOOSE(I) . h ∈ {1, 2}
9: w1(v)← w1(v) exp(−η(v)`1,h(v))
10: w2(v)← w2(v) exp(−η(v)`2,h(v))
11: return (p, h)
Figure 9: Function Ewa
The number of times the algorithm resets is at most 2s + 1. Let j∗ be the first index such that t′′j∗ ≥ 2/∆.
For any j∗ ≤ j ≤ s, ρˆt′′j ≥ (ρ′1 + ρ′2)/2 and ρˆt j ≤ ρ′1. According to the update rule we have for any t′′j < t ≤ t j
that
ρˆt =
(
1 − 1
t
)
ρˆt−1 +
1
t
· I (Jt = 2)
pt
≥ ρˆt−1 − 1t ρˆt−1 ≥ ρˆt−1 −
1
t
and hence ρˆt−1 − ρˆt ≤ 1t . Summing this inequality for all t′′j + 1 ≤ t ≤ t j such that j ≥ j∗ we get
∆
2
=
ρ′1 + ρ
′
2
2
− ρ′1 ≤ ρˆt′′j − ρˆt j
≤
t j∑
t=t′′j +1
1
t
= O
ln t jt′′j
 .
Thus, there exists c > 0 such that for all j∗ ≤ j ≤ s
1
c
∆ ≤ ln t j
t′′j
≤ ln t j
t j−1
. (3)
Adding (3) for j∗ < j ≤ s we get (s − j∗) 1c ∆ ≤ ln ts2/∆ ≤ ln T . We conclude the proof with observing that
j∗ ≤ 2/∆.
The next lemma shows that the estimate of the relative frequency of outcome 2 is not far away from its
true value.
Lemma 12. For any 0 < δ < 1, with probability at least 1−δ, for all t ≥ 8√T ln(2T/δ)/(3∆2), |ρˆt−ρt| ≤ ∆.
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The proof of the lemma employs Bernstein’s inequality for martingales.
Bernstein’s inequality for martingales. [20, Lemma A.8] Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be a bounded martingale
difference sequence with respect to a filtration {F }ni=0 and with |Xi| ≤ K. Let
S i =
i∑
j=1
X j
be the associated martingale. Denote the sum of conditional variances by
Σ2n =
n∑
i=1
E[X2i | Fi−1] .
Then, for all constants , v > 0,
Pr
[
max
i∈n S i >  and Σ
2
n ≤ v
]
≤ exp
(
− 
2
2(v + K/3)
)
.
Proof of Lemma 12. For 1 ≤ t ≤ T , let pt be the conditional probability of playing a revealing action at
time step t, given the historyH1:t−1. Recall that, due to the construction of the algorithm, pt ≥ 1/
√
T .
If we write ρˆt in its explicit form ρˆt = 1t
∑t
s=1
I(Hs=2)
ps
we can observe that E[ρˆt|H1:t−1] = ρt, that is, ρˆt
is an unbiased estimate of the relative frequency. Let us define random variables Xs :=
I(Hs=2)
ps
− I (Js = 2).
Since ps is determined by the history, {Xs}s is a martingale difference sequence. Also, from ps ≥ 1/
√
T we
know that Var(Xs|H1:t−1) ≤
√
T . Hence, we can use Bernstein’s inequality for martingales with  = ∆t,
ν = t
√
T , K =
√
T :
Pr
[|ρˆt − ρt| > ∆] = Pr 
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
t∑
s=1
Xs
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > t∆

≤ 2 exp
(
− ∆
2t2/2
t
√
T + ∆t
√
T/3
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− 3∆
2t
8
√
T
)
.
We have that if t ≥ 8√T ln(2T/δ)/(3∆2) then
Pr
[|ρˆt − ρt| > ∆] ≤ δ/T .
We get the bound for all t ∈ [8√T ln(2T/δ)/(3∆2),T ] using the union bound.
Proof of Theorem 10. To prove that the algorithm achieves the desired regret bound we use induction on the
depth of the tree, d. If d = 1, AppleTree plays either EWA or Exp3.P. EWA is known to satisfy Theorem 10,
and, as we discussed earlier, Exp3.P achieves O(
√
T ln T/δ) regret as well. As the induction hypothesis we
assume that Theorem 10 is true for any T and any game such that the tree built by the algorithm has depth
d′ < d.
Let Q1 = {1, . . . , dK/2e}, Q2 = {dK/2e, . . . ,K} be the sets of actions associated with the subgames in
the root. (Recall that the actions are ordered with respect to `·,1.) Furthermore, let us define the following
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values: Let T 00 = 1, let T
0
i be the first time step t after T
0
i−1 such that gt , gt−1. In other words, T
0
i are
the time steps when the algorithm switches between the subgames. Finally, let Ti = min(T 0i ,T + 1). From
Lemma 11 we know that TSmax+1 = T + 1, where Smax =
c∗ ln T
∆
. It is easy to see that Ti are stopping times
for any i ≥ 1.
Without loss of generality, from now on we will assume that the optimal action i∗ ∈ Q1. If i∗ = dK/2e
then, since it is contained in both subgames, the bound trivially follows from the induction hypothesis and
Lemma 11. In the rest of the proof we assume i∗ < K/2.
Let S = max{i ≥ 1 | T 0i ≤ T } be the number of switches, c = 83∆2 , and B be the event that for all
t ≥ c√T ln(4T/δ), |ρˆt − ρt| ≤ ∆. We know from Lemma 12 that Pr[B] ≥ 1 − δ/2. On B we have that
|ρˆT − ρT | ≤ ∆, and thus, using that i∗ < K/2, ρT ≤ ρ∗1. This implies that in the last phase the algorithm plays
on G1. It is also easy to see that before the last switch, at time step TS − 1, ρˆ is between ρ∗1 and ρ∗2, if TS is
large enough. Thus, up to time step TS − 1, the optimal action is dK/2e, the one that is shared by the two
subgames. This implies that
∑TS−1
t=1 `i∗,Jt − `dK/2e,Jt ≥ 0. On the other hand, if TS ≤ c
√
T ln(4T/δ) then
TS−1∑
t=1
`i∗,Jt − `dK/2e,Jt ≥ −c
√
T ln(4T/δ) .
Thus, we have
R̂T =
T∑
t=1
`It ,Jt − `i∗,Jt
=
TS−1∑
t=1
(
`It ,Jt − `i∗,Jt
)
+
T∑
t=TS
(
`It ,Jt − `i∗,Jt
)
≤ I (B)
TS−1∑
t=1
(
`It ,Jt − `dK/2e,Jt
)
+
T∑
t=TS
(
`It ,Jt − `i∗,Jt
)
+ c
√
T ln(4T/δ) +
(
I
(Bc)) T︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
D
≤ D + I (B)
Smax∑
r=1
max
i∈Qpi(r)
Tr−1∑
t=Tr−1
(
`It ,Jt − `i,Jt
)
= D + I (B)
Smax∑
r=1
max
i∈Qpi(r)
T∑
m=1
I (Tr − Tr−1 = m)
Tr−1+m−1∑
t=Tr−1
(
`It ,Jt − `i,Jt
)
,
where pi(r) is 1 if r is odd and 2 if r is even. Note that for the last line of the above inequality chain to be
well defined, we need outcome sequences of length at most 2T . It does us no harm to assume that for all
T < t ≤ 2T , say, Jt = 1.
Recall that the strategies that play in the subgames are reset after the switches. Hence, the sum R̂
(r)
m =∑Tr−1+m−1
t=Tr−1
(
`It ,Jt − `i,Jt
)
is the regret of the algorithm if it is used in the subgame Gpi(r) for m ≤ T steps. Then,
exploiting that Tr are stopping times, we can use the induction hypothesis to bound R̂
(r)
m . In particular, let C
be the event that for all m ≤ T the sum is less than c√T lnp(2T 2/δ). Since the root node calls its children
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with confidence parameter δ/(2T ), we have that Pr[Cc] ≤ δ/2. In summary,
R̂T ≤ D + I (Cc) T + I (B) I (C) Smaxc√T lnp 2T 2/δ
≤ I (Bc ∪ Cc) T + c√T ln(4T/δ) + I (B) I (C) c∗ ln T
∆
c
√
T lnp 2T 2/δ.
Thus, on B∩C, R̂T ≤ 2pcc∗∆
√
T lnp+1 (2T/δ) , which, together with Pr[Bc∪Cc] ≤ δ concludes the proof.
Remark The above theorem proves a high probability bound on the regret. We can get a bound on the
expected regret if we set δ to 1/
√
T . Also note that the bound given by the induction grows in the number
of non-dominated actions as O(Klog2 K).
6. Lower Bound for Non-Trivial Games
In the following sections, ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖ denote the L1- and L2-norm of a vector in a Euclidean space,
respectively.
In this section, we show that non-trivial games have minimax regret at least Ω(
√
T ). We state and prove
this result for all finite games, in contrast to earlier related lower bounds which apply to specific losses (see
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [20, Theorems 3.7, 6.3, 6.4, 6.11] for full-information, label efficient, and bandit
games).
Theorem 13 (Lower bound for non-trivial games). If G = (L,H) is a finite non-trivial (K ≥ 2) partial-
monitoring game then there exists a constant c > 0 such that for any T ≥ 1 the minimax expected regret
RT (G) ≥ c
√
T.
The proof presented below works for stochastic nature, as well. There is a far simpler proof in the
Appendix, however, that one applies only for adversarial nature.
Recall that ∆M ⊂ RM is the (M − 1)-dimensional probability simplex.
For the proof, we start with a geometrical lemma, which ensures the existence of a pair i1,i2 of non-
dominated actions that are “neighbors” in the sense that for any small enough  > 0, there exists a pair of
“-close” outcome distributions p+ v and p− v such that i1 is uniquely optimal under the first distribution,
and i2 is uniquely optimal under the second distribution overtaking each non-optimal action by at least Ω()
in both cases.
Lemma 14 (-close distributions). Let G = (L,H) be any finite non-trivial game with N non-duplicate
actions and M ≥ 2 outcomes. Then there exist two non-dominated actions i1,i2 ∈ N, p ∈ ∆M, v ∈ RM \ {0},
and c,α > 0 satisfying the following properties:
(a) `i1 , `i2 .
(b) 〈`i1 , p〉 = 〈`i2 , p〉 ≤ 〈`i, p〉 for all i ∈ N and the coordinates of p are positive.
(c) Coordinates of v satisfy
∑M
j=1 v( j) = 0.
For any  ∈ (0, α),
(d) p1 = p + v ∈ ∆M and p2 = p − v ∈ ∆M,
(e) for any i ∈ N, i , i1, we have 〈`i − `i1 , p1〉 ≥ c,
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(f) for any i ∈ N, i , i2, we have 〈`i − `i2 , p2〉 ≥ c.
Proof of Lemma 14. For any action i ∈ N, consider the cell
Ci = {p ∈ ∆M : ∀i′ ∈ N, 〈`i, p〉 ≤ 〈`i′ , p〉}
in the probability simplex ∆M. The cell Ci corresponds to the set of outcome distributions under which
action i is optimal. Each cell is the intersection of some closed half-spaces and ∆M, and thus it is a compact
convex polytope of dimension at most M − 1. Note that
N⋃
i=1
Ci = ∆M. (4)
For C ⊆ ∆M, denote int C its interior in the topology induced by the hyperplane {x ∈ RM : 〈(1, . . . , 1), x〉 =
1} and rint C its relative interior6. Let λ be the (M − 1)-dimensional Lebesgue-measure. It is easy to see that
for any pair of cells Ci, Ci′ , Ci′ ∩ int Ci = ∅, that is, λ(Ci ∩Ci′) = 0, and so
int Ci ⊆ Ci \
⋃
i′,i
Ci′ . (5)
Hence the cells form a cell-decomposition of the simplex. Any two cells Ci and Ci′ are separated by the
hyperplane fi,i′ = {x ∈ RM : 〈`i, x〉 = 〈`i′ , x〉}. Note that Ci ∩ Ci′ ⊂ fi,i′ . The cells are characterized by the
following lemma (which itself holds also with duplicate actions):
Lemma 15. Action i is dominated ⇔ Ci ⊆ ⋃i′:`i′,`i Ci′ ⇔ int Ci = ∅ ⇔ λ(Ci) = 0, that is, Ci is (M − 1)-
dimensional (has positive λ-measure) if and only if there is p ∈ Ci \⋃i′:`i′,`i Ci′ . Hence there is three kind
of “cells”:
1. Ci = ∅ (action i is never optimal),
2. Ci , ∅ has dimension less than M−1, int Ci = ∅, λ(Ci) = 0, Ci ⊆ ⋃i′:`i′,`i Ci′ (action i is degenerate),
3. action i is non-dominated, Ci is (M − 1)-dimensional, rint Ci = int Ci , ∅, λ(Ci) > 0, there is
p ∈ Ci \⋃i′:`i′,`i Ci′ .
Moreover
⋃
i<DCi = ∆M for the setD of dominated actions.
The proof is in the Appendix.
The non-triviality of the game (K ≥ 2) means that there are at least two non-dominated actions of type
3 above. In the cell decomposition, due to Lemma 15, there must exist two such (M − 1)-dimensional cells
Ci1 and Ci2 corresponding to two non-dominated actions i1,i2, such that their intersection Ci1 ∩ Ci2 is an
(M − 2)-dimensional polytope. Clearly, `i1 , `i2 , since otherwise the cells would coincide; thus part (a) is
satisfied.
Moreover, rint(Ci1 ∩Ci2) ⊆ rint ∆M since otherwise λ(Ci1) or λ(Ci2) would be zero. We can choose any
p ∈ rint(Ci1 ∩ Ci2). This choice of p guarantees that p ∈ fi1,i2 , 〈`i1 , p〉 = 〈`i2 , p〉, p ∈ rint ∆M, and part
(b) is satisfied. Since Ci1 ∩ Ci2 is (M − 2)-dimensional, it also implies that there exists δ > 0 such that the
δ-neighborhood {q ∈ RM : ‖p − q‖ < δ} of p is contained in rint(Ci1 ∪Ci2).
Since p ∈ fi1,i2 therefore the hyperplane of vectors satisfying (c) does not coincide with fi1,i2 implying
that we can choose v ∈ RM \ {0} satisfying part (c), ‖v‖ < δ, and v < fi1,i2 . We can assume
〈`i2 − `i1 , v〉 > 0 (6)
6Relative interior of C ⊆ RM is its interior in the topology induced by the smallest affine space containing it.
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(otherwise we choose −v). Since p±v lie in the δ-neighborhood of p, they lie in rint(Ci1∪Ci2). In particular,
since 〈`i1 , p + v〉 < 〈`i2 , p + v〉 and 〈`i2 , p − v〉 < 〈`i1 , p − v〉, p + v ∈ rint Ci1 and p − v ∈ rint Ci2 . Let
p1 = p + v and p2 = p − v . (7)
The convexity of Ci1 and Ci2 implies that for any  ∈ (0, 1], p1 ∈ rint Ci1 and p2 ∈ rint Ci2 . This, in particular,
ensures that p1,p2 ∈ ∆M and part (d) holds.
To prove (e) define I = {i ∈ N : `i is collinear with `i1 and `i2}. We consider two cases: As the first case
fix action i ∈ I \ {i1}, that is, `i is an affine combination `i = ai`i1 + bi`i2 for some ai + bi = 1. Since i1 and
i2 are non-dominated, this must be a convex combination with ai,bi ≥ 0. There is no duplicate action, thus
`i , `i1 implying bi , 0. Hence bi > 0, and from (7) for any  ≥ 0
〈`i − `i1 , p1〉 = 〈bi`i2 − bi`i1 , p + v〉 = bi〈`i2 − `i1 , v〉 ≥ c
provided that 0 < c ≤ mini∈I\{i1} bi〈`i2 − `i1 , v〉 = c′. From (6) we know that bi〈`i2 − `i1 , v〉 and so c′ are
positive.
As the second case suppose i < I. Then, the hyperplane fi1,i does not coincide with fi1,i2 . Since
p ∈ rint(Ci1 ∩ Ci2), p ∈ fi1,i would contradict to fi1,i ∩ rint Ci1 = ∅ implied by (5). Thus p ∈ Ci1 \ fi1,i and
therefore 〈`i1 , p〉 < 〈`i, p〉. This means that if we choose 0 < c ≤ min(c′, 12 mini<I〈`i − `i1 , p〉) (that is
positive and depends only on L and not on T ) then for  < α = min(1, c/maxi<I |〈`i − `i1 , v〉|), from (7) we
have again
〈`i − `i1 , p1〉 ≥ 2c + 〈`i − `i1 , v〉 > c > c .
Part (f) is proved analogously to part (e), and by adjusting α and c if necessary.
We now continue with a technical lemma, which quantifies an upper bound on the Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence (or relative entropy) between the two distributions from the previous lemma. Recall that
the KL divergence between two probability distributions p,q ∈ ∆M is defined as
D(p ‖ q) =
M∑
j=1
p j ln
(
p j
q j
)
.
Lemma 16 (KL divergence of -close distributions). Let p ∈ ∆M be a probability vector. For any vector
ε ∈ RM such that both p − ε and p + ε lie in ∆M and |ε( j)| ≤ p( j)/2 for all j ∈ M, the KL divergence of
p − ε and p + ε satisfies
D(p − ε ‖ p + ε) ≤ c‖ε‖2
for some constant c depending only on p.
Proof of Lemma 16. Since p, p+ε, and p−ε are all probability vectors, notice that the coordinates of ε have
to sum up to zero. Also if a coordinate of p is zero then the corresponding coordinate of ε has to be zero as
well. As zero coordinates do not modify the KL divergence, we can assume without loss of generality that
all coordinates of p are positive. By definition,
D(p − ε ‖ p + ε) =
M∑
j=1
(p( j) − ε( j)) ln
(
p( j) − ε( j)
p( j) + ε( j)
)
.
We write the logarithmic factor as
ln
(
p( j) − ε( j)
p( j) + ε( j)
)
= ln
(
1 − ε( j)
p( j)
)
− ln
(
1 +
ε( j)
p( j)
)
.
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We use the second order Taylor expansion ln(1 ± x) = ±x − x2/2 + O(|x|3) around 0 to get that ln(1 − x) −
ln(1 + x) = −2x + r(x), where r(x) is a remainder upper bounded for all |x| ≤ 1/2 as |r(x)| ≤ c′|x|3 with some
universal constant c′ > 0.7 Substituting
D(p − ε ‖ p + ε) =
M∑
j=1
(p( j) − ε( j))
[
−2ε( j)
p( j)
+ r
(
ε( j)
p( j)
)]
= −2
M∑
j=1
ε( j) + 2
M∑
j=1
ε2( j)
p( j)
+
M∑
j=1
(p( j) − ε( j)) · r
(
ε( j)
p( j)
)
.
Here the first term is 0. Letting p = min j∈M p( j), the second term is bounded by 2
∑M
j=1 ε
2( j)/p = (2/p)‖ε‖2,
and the third term is bounded by
M∑
j=1
(p( j) − ε( j))
∣∣∣∣∣∣r
(
ε( j)
p( j)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ c′ M∑
j=1
(p( j) − ε( j)) |ε( j)|
3
p3( j)
= c′
M∑
j=1
( |ε( j)|
p( j)
− ε( j)|ε( j)|
p2( j)
)
ε2( j)
p( j)
≤ c′
M∑
j=1
( |ε( j)|
p( j)
+
|ε( j)|2
p2( j)
)
ε2( j)
p( j)
≤ c′
M∑
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
4
)
ε2( j)
p
=
3c′
4p
‖ε‖2 .
Hence, D(p − ε ‖ p + ε) ≤ 8+3c′4p ‖ε‖2 = c‖ε‖2 for c = 8+3c
′
4p .
Proof of Theorem 13. The proof is similar as in Auer et al. [5]. When M = 1, G is always trivial, thus we
assume that M ≥ 2. Without loss of generality we may assume that all the actions are all-revealing. Then,
as in Section 3 for M=2, we can also assume that there are no duplicate actions, thus for any two actions i
and i′, `i , `i′ .
Lemma 14 implies that there exist two actions i1,i2, p ∈ ∆M, v ∈ RM, and c1,α > 0 satisfying conditions
(a)–(f). To avoid cumbersome indexing, by renaming the actions we can achieve that i1 = 1 and i2 = 2. Let
p1 = p + v and p2 = p − v for some  ∈ (0, α). We determine the precise value of  later. By Lemma 14
(d), p1,p2 ∈ ∆M.
Fix any randomized learning algorithm A and time horizon T . We use randomization replacing the out-
comes by a sequence J1, J2, . . . , JT of random variables i.i.d. according to pk, k ∈ {1, 2}, and independently
of the internal randomization of A. Let
N(k)i = N
(k)
i (A,T ) =
T∑
t=1
Prk[It = i] ∈ [0,T ] (8)
be the expected number of times action i is chosen by A under pk up to time step T . With subindex k, Prk
and Ek denote probability and expectation given outcome model k ∈ {1, 2}, respectively.
Lemma 17. For any partial-monitoring game with N actions and M outcomes, algorithm A and outcome
distribution pk ∈ ∆M such that action k is optimal under pk, we have
R¯T (A,G) ≥
∑
i∈N
i,k
N(k)i 〈`i − `k, pk〉, k = 1, 2 . (9)
7In fact, one can take c′ = 8 ln(3/e) ≈ 0.79.
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The proof is in the Appendix.
Parts (e) and (f) of Lemma 14 imply that 〈`k, pk〉 ≤ 〈`i, pk〉 for k ∈ {1, 2} and any i ∈ N, hence R¯T (A,G)
can be bounded in terms of N(k)i using Lemma 17. They also imply that for any i ∈ N if `i , `k then〈`i − `k, pk〉 ≥ c1. Therefore, we can continue lower bounding (9) as∑
i∈N
i,k
N(k)i 〈`i − `k, pk〉 ≥
∑
i∈N
i,k
N(k)i c1 = c1
(
T − N(k)k
)
 . (10)
Collecting (9) and (10), we see that the worst-case regret of A is lower bounded by
R¯T (A,G) ≥ c1
(
T − N(k)k
)
 (11)
for k ∈ {1, 2}. Averaging (11) over k ∈ {1, 2} we get
R¯T (A,G) ≥ c1
(
2T − N(1)1 − N(2)2
)
/2 . (12)
We now focus on lower bounding 2T − N(1)1 − N(2)2 . We start by showing that N(2)2 is close to N(1)2 . The
following lemma, which is the key lemma of both lower bound proofs, carries that out formally and states
that the expected number of times an action is played by A does not change too much when we change the
model, if the outcome distributions p1 and p2 are “close” in KL-divergence:
Lemma 18. For any partial-monitoring game with N actions and M outcomes, algorithm A, pair of out-
come distributions p1,p2 ∈ ∆M and action i, we have
N(2)i − N(1)i ≤ T
√
D(p2 ‖ p1)N(2)rev/2 and N(1)i − N(2)i ≤ T
√
D(p1 ‖ p2)N(1)rev/2,
where N(k)rev =
∑T
t=1 Prk[It ∈ R] =
∑
i∈R N
(k)
i under model pk, k = 1,2 with R being the set of revealing
actions.8
The proof is in the Appendix.
We use Lemma 18 for i = 2 and that N(2)rev ≤ T to bound the difference N(2)2 − N(1)2 as
N(2)2 − N(1)2 ≤ T
√
D(p2 ‖ p1)T/2 = T 3/2
√
D(p2 ‖ p1)/2 . (13)
We upper bound D(p2 ‖ p1) using Lemma 16 with ε = v. The lemma implies that D(p2 ‖ p1) ≤ c22 for
 < 0 with some 0, c2 > 0 which depend only on v and p. Putting this together with (13) we get
N(2)2 < N
(1)
2 + c3T
3/2
where c3 =
√
c2/2. Together with N
(1)
1 + N
(1)
2 ≤ T we get
2T − N(1)1 − N(2)2 > 2T − N(1)1 − N(1)2 − c3T 3/2 ≥ T − c3T 3/2 .
Substituting into (12) and choosing  = 1/(2c3T 1/2) gives the desired lower bound
R¯T (A,G) >
c1
8c3
√
T
8It seems from the proof that N(k)rev could be slightly sharpened to N
(k,T−1)
rev =
∑T−1
t=1 Prk[It ∈ R].
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provided that our choice of  ensures that  < min(α, 0) =: 1 that depends only on L. This condition is
satisfied for all T > T0 = 1/(2c31)2. Since c1, c3, and 1 depend only on L, for such T , RT (G) ≥ c18c3
√
T .
The non-triviality of the game implies that Lemma 3 d) does not hold, so neither does b), that is,
RT (G) > 0 for T ≥ 1. Thus choosing
c = min
(
min
1≤T≤T0
RT (G)√
T
,
c1
8c3
)
,
c > 0 and for any T , RT (G) ≥ c
√
T .
Remark Theorem 13 also holds if M = ∞. Namely, since the proof of c)⇒d) of Lemma 3 remains
obviously valid, the non-triviality of the game (K ≥ 2) excludes that c) holds, and thus for each i ∈ N there
is ji ∈ {1, 2, . . . } such that `i, ji is not minimal in the jthi column of L. Then take the minor of L consisting
of its (at most N) columns corresponding to O = { j1, . . . , jN}. For the corresponding finite game GO (that
does not depend on A), Lemma 3 c) still does not hold, thus nor d) does, and GO is also non-trivial. Hence
Theorem 13 implies that9
RT (G) = inf
A
sup
j1:T∈{1,2,... }T
RT (A,G) ≥ inf
A
sup
j1:T∈OT
RT (A,G) = RT (GO) = Ω
(√
T
)
.
7. Lower Bound for Hard Games
In this section, we present an Ω(T 2/3) lower bound for the expected regret of any two-outcome game in
the case when the separation condition does not hold.
Theorem 19 (Lower bound for hard games). If M = 2 and G = (L,H) satisfies the non-degeneracy
condition and the separation condition does not hold then there exists a constant C > 0 such that for any
T ≥ 1 the minimax expected regret RT (G) ≥ CT 2/3.
Proof of Theorem 19. We follow the lower bound proof for the label efficient prediction from Cesa-Bianchi
et al. [22] with a few changes. The most important change, as we will see, is the choice of the models we
randomize over.
As the first step, the following lemma shows that non-revealing degenerate actions do not influence the
minimax regret of a game.
Lemma 20. Let G be a non-degenerate game with two outcomes. Let G′ be the game we get by removing
the degenerate non-revealing actions from G. Then RT (G) = RT (G′).
The proof of this lemma can be found in the Appendix.
By the non-degeneracy condition and Lemma 20, we can assume without loss of generality that G does
not have degenerate actions. We can also assume without loss of generality that actions 1 and 2 are the two
consecutive non-dominated non-revealing actions. It follows by scaling and a reduction similar to the one
we used in Section 5.1 that we can further assume (`1,1, `1,2) = (0, α), (`2,1, `2,2) = (1 − α, 0) with some
α ∈ (0, 1). Using the non-degeneracy condition and that actions 1 and 2 are consecutive non-dominated
actions, we get that for all i ≥ 3, there exists some λi ∈ R depending only on L such that
`i,1 > λi`1,1 + (1 − λi)`2,1 = (1 − λi)(1 − α) ,
`i,2 > λi`1,2 + (1 − λi)`2,2 = λiα . (14)
9The same reasoning can be used to show that we could assume without loss of generality M ≤ N in the proof of Theorem 13.
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Let λmin = mini≥3 λi, λmax = maxi≥3 λi, and λ∗ = λmax − λmin.
We define two models for generating outcomes from {1, 2}. In model 1, the outcome distribution is
p1(1) = α+, p1(2) = 1−p1(1), whereas in model 2, p2(1) = α−, p2(2) = 1−p2(1) with 0 <  ≤ min(α, 1−
α)/2 to be chosen later. We use randomization replacing the outcomes by a sequence J1, J2, . . . , JT of
random variables i.i.d. according to pk, k ∈ {1, 2}, and independently of the internal randomization of A.
Let N(k)i be the expected number of times action i is chosen by A under pk up to time step T , as in (8). With
subindex k, Prk and Ek denote probability and expectation given outcome model k ∈ {1, 2}, respectively.
Finally, let N(k)≥3 =
∑
i≥3 N
(k)
i . Note that, if  < 0 with some 0 depending only on L then only actions 1 and
2 can be optimal for these models. Namely, action k is optimal under pk, hence R¯T (A,G) can be bounded
in terms of N(k)i using Lemma 17:
R¯T (A,G) ≥
∑
i∈N
i,k
N(k)i 〈`i − `k, pk〉 =
N∑
i=3
N(k)i 〈`i − `k, pk〉 + N(k)3−k〈`3−k − `k, pk〉 (15)
for k = 1,2. Now, by (14), there exists τ > 0 depending only on L such that for all i ≥ 3, `i,1 ≥ (1 − λi)(1 −
α) + τ and `i,2 ≥ αλi + τ. These bounds and simple algebra give that
〈`i − `1, p1〉 = (`i,1 − `1,1)(α + ) + (`i,2 − `1,2)(1 − α − )
≥ ((1 − λi)(1 − α) + τ)(α + ) + (αλi + τ − α)(1 − α − )
= (1 − λi) + τ
≥ (1 − λmax) + τ =: f1
and
〈`2 − `1, p1〉 = (1 − α)(α + ) − α(1 − α − ) =  .
Analogously, we get
〈`i − `2, p2〉 ≥ λmin + τ =: f2 and 〈`1 − `2, p2〉 =  .
Note that if  < τ/max(|1 − λmax|, |λmin|) then both f1 and f2 are positive. Substituting these into (15) gives
R¯T (A,G) ≥ fkN(k)≥3 + N(k)3−k . (16)
The following lemma is an application of Lemma 18 and 16:
Lemma 21. There exists a constant c > 0 (depending on α only) such that
N(1)2 ≥ N(2)2 − cT 
√
N(2)≥3 and N
(2)
1 ≥ N(1)1 − cT 
√
N(1)≥3 .
Proof. We only prove the first inequality, the other one is symmetric. Using Lemma 18 with M = 2, i = 2
and the fact that actions 1 and 2 are non-revealing, we have
N(2)2 − N(1)2 ≤ T
√
D(p2 ‖ p1)N(2)≥3/2 .
Lemma 16 with M = 2, p = (α, 1 − α)>, and ε = (,−)> gives D(p2 ‖ p1) ≤ cˆ2, where cˆ depends only on
α. Rearranging and substituting c =
√
cˆ/2 yields the first statement of the lemma.
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Let l = arg mink∈{1,2} N(k)≥3 . Now, for k , l we can lower bound the regret using Lemma 21 for (16):
R¯T (A,G) ≥ fkN(k)≥3 + 
(
N(l)3−k − cT 
√
N(l)≥3
)
≥ fkN(l)≥3 + 
(
N(l)3−k − cT 
√
N(l)≥3
)
, (17)
as fk > 0. For k = l we do this subtracting cT 2
√
N(l)≥3 ≥ 0 from the right-hand side of (16) leading to the
same lower bound, hence (17) holds for k = 1,2. Finally, averaging (17) over k ∈ {1, 2} we have the bound
f1 + f2
2
N(l)≥3 + 
N(l)2 + N(l)12 − cT 
√
N(l)≥3
 = ( (1 − λmax + λmin)2 + τ
)
N(l)≥3 + 
T − N(l)≥32
 − cT 2 √N(l)≥3
=
(
τ − λ
∗
2
)
N(l)≥3 +
T
2
− cT 2
√
N(l)≥3 .
Choosing  = c2T−1/3 (≤ c2) with c2 > 0 gives
R¯T (A,G) ≥
(
τ − λ
∗c2T−1/3
2
)
N(l)≥3 +
c2T 2/3
2
− cc22T 1/3
√
N(l)≥3
≥
(
τ − λ
∗c2
2
)
N(l)≥3 +
c2T 2/3
2
− cc22T 1/3
√
N(l)≥3
=
((
τ − λ
∗c2
2
)
x2 +
c2
2
− cc22x
)
T 2/3 = q(x)T 2/3,
where x = T−1/3
√
N(l)≥3 and q(x) can be written and lower bounded as
q(x) =
(
τ − λ
∗c2
2
) x − cc222τ − λ∗c2
2 + c22 − c2c424τ − 2λ∗c2 ≥ c22
(
1 − c
2c2
2τ − λ∗c2
)
independently of x whenever λ∗c2 < 2τ and c2 ≤ 1. Now it is easy to see that if c2 = min(τ/(c2 + λ∗), 1)
then these hold, moreover, q(x) ≥ c2/4 > 0 giving the desired lower bound
R¯T (A,G) ≥ c24 T
2/3
provided that our choice of  ensures that  < min(α/2, (1−α)/2, 0, τ/|1−λmax|, τ/|λmin|) =: 1 that depends
only on L. This condition is satisfied for all T > T0 = (c2/1)3. Since c2 and 1 depend only on L, for such
T , RT (G) ≥ c24 T 2/3.
If the separation condition does not hold then the game is clearly non-trivial which, using Lemma 3 b)
and d) as in the proof of Theorem 13, implies that RT (G) > 0 for T ≥ 1. Thus choosing
C = min
(
min
1≤T≤T0
RT (G)
T 2/3
,
c2
4
)
,
C > 0 and for any T , RT (G) ≥ CT 2/3.
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8. Discussion
In this paper we classified non-degenerate partial-monitoring games with two outcomes based on their
minimax regret. An immediate question is how the classification extends to degenerate games. Unfortu-
nately, the degeneracy condition is needed in both the upper and lower bound proofs. We do not even know
if all degenerate games fall into one of the four categories or there are some games with minimax regret
of Θ˜(Tα) for some α ∈ (1/2, 2/3). Nonetheless, we conjecture that, if the revealing degenerate actions are
included in the chain of non-dominated actions, the classification theorem holds without any change.
The most important open question is whether our results generalize to games with more outcomes. A
simple observation is that, given a finite partial-monitoring game, if we restrict the opponent’s choices to
any two outcomes, the resulting game’s hardness serves as a lower bound on the minimax regret of the
original game. This gives us a sufficient condition that a game has Ω(T 2/3) minimax regret. We believe that
the Ω(T 2/3) lower bound can also be generalized to situations where two “-close” outcome distributions
are not distinguishable by playing only their respective optimal actions. Generalizing the upper bound result
seems more challenging. The algorithm AppleTree heavily exploits the two-dimensional structure of the
losses and, as of yet, in general we do not know how to construct an algorithm that achieves O˜(
√
T ) regret
on partial-monitoring games with more than two outcomes.
It is also important to note that our upper bound result heavily exploits the assumption that the opponent
is oblivious. Our results do not extend to games with non-oblivious opponents, to the best of our knowledge.
Appendix A.
Proof of Lemma 3. a)⇒b) is obvious.
b)⇒c) For any A,
R¯T (A,G) ≥ sup
j∈M,J1=···=JT = j
E
 T∑
t=1
`It ,Jt −mini∈N
T∑
t=1
`i,Jt

= sup
j∈M
E
 T∑
t=1
`It , j − T mini∈N `i, j

≥ sup
j∈M
(
E
[
`I1, j
]
−min
i∈N `i, j
)
= f (A) .
b) leads to
0 = RT (G) = inf
A
R¯T (A,G) ≥ inf
A
f (A) .
Observe that f (A) depends on A through only the distribution of I1 on N denoted by q = q(A) now, that
is, f (A) = f ′(q) for proper f ′. This dependence is continuous on the compact domain of q, hence the
infimum can be replaced by minimum. Thus minq f ′(q) ≤ 0, that is, there exists a q such that for all j ∈ M,
E
[
`I1, j
]
= mini∈N `i, j. This implies that the support of q contains only actions whose loss is not larger than
the loss of any other action irrespectively of the choice of Nature’s action. (Such an action is obviously
non-dominated as shown by any p ∈ ∆M supported on all outcomes.)
c)⇒d) Action i in c) is non-dominated, and any other action with loss vector distinct from `i is dominated
(by i and any action with loss vector `i).
d)⇒a) For any action i ∈ N, as in the proof of Lemma 14, consider the compact convex cell Ci in ∆M.
By Lemma 15
⋃
i<DCi = ∆M. This and d) imply that there is an i with Ci = ∆M, that is, i is optimal for any
outcome. So the algorithm that always plays i has zero regret for all outcome sequences and T .
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Proof of Theorem 2 Case (1d). We know that K ≥ 2 and G has no revealing action. Then for any A,
R¯T (A,G) ≥ sup
j∈M,J1=···=JT = j
E
 T∑
t=1
`It ,Jt −mini∈N
T∑
t=1
`i,Jt

≥ 1
M
M∑
j=1
E
 T∑
t=1
`It , j − T mini∈N `i, j

=
1
M
T∑
t=1
E
 M∑
j=1
`It , j
 − TM
M∑
j=1
min
i∈N `i, j .
Here It is a random variable usually depending on J1:T−1, that is, on j through the outcomes. However, since
G has no revealing action, now the distribution of It is independent of j, thus E[
∑M
j=1 `It , j] ≥ mini∈N
∑M
j=1 `i, j
for each t, and we have
R¯T (A,G) ≥ T 1M
mini∈N
M∑
j=1
`i, j −
M∑
j=1
min
i∈N `i, j
︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
c
= cT ,
where c > 0 if K ≥ 2 (because c ≥ 0, and c = 0 would imply Lemma 3 c), thus also d)). Since c depends
only on L, RT (G) ≥ cT = Θ(T ).
Proof of Lemma 15. By Definition 1, action i is dominated if and only if Ci ⊆ ⋃i′:`i′,`i Ci′ .
Ci ⊆ ⋃i′:`i′,`i Ci′ ⇒ int Ci = ∅: Since `i′ , `i ⇒ i , i, follows from (5).
int Ci = ∅ ⇒ λ(Ci) = 0: Follows from convexity of Ci.
λ(Ci) = 0⇒ Ci ⊆ ⋃i′:`i′,`i Ci′ : indirect: if p ∈ Ci is in the complementer of ⋃i′:`i′,`i Ci′ , that is open in
∆M, then there is a neighborhood S of p in ∆M disjoint from
⋃
i′:`i′,`i Ci′ . Thus S ⊆
⋃
i′:`i′=`i Ci′ = Ci due
to (4), and λ(Ci) ≥ λ(S ) > 0, contradiction.
Since λ(
⋃
i∈DCi) ≤ ∑i∈D λ(Ci) = 0, thus from (4) λ(⋃i<DCi) ≥ λ(∆M), and λ(∆M \⋃i<DCi) = 0. The
latest set is open in ∆M, so it must be empty, that is,
⋃
i<DCi = ∆M.
Proof of Lemma 17. Clearly, the worst-case expected regret of A is at least its average regret:
R¯T (A,G) = sup
j1:T∈MT
RT (A,G) ≥ Ek[RT (A,G)] = Ek
 T∑
t=1
`It ,Jt −mini∈N
T∑
t=1
`i,Jt
 ,
where the expectation on the right-hand side is taken with respect to both the random choices of the out-
comes and the internal randomization of A. We lower bound the right-hand side switching expectation and
minimum to get
Ek
 T∑
t=1
`It ,Jt −mini∈N
T∑
t=1
`i,Jt
 ≥ T∑
t=1
Ek `It ,Jt −mini∈N
T∑
t=1
Ek `i,Jt
=
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
Ek
[
I (It = i) `i,Jt
] −min
i∈N
T∑
t=1
〈`i, pk〉
=
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
Ek I (It = i) Ek `i,Jt − T mini∈N 〈`i, pk〉
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(by the independence of It and Jt)
=
N∑
i=1
〈`i, pk〉
T∑
t=1
Prk[It = i] − T min
i∈N 〈`i, pk〉
=
N∑
i=1
N(k)i 〈`i, pk〉 − T 〈`k, pk〉 (A.1)
=
∑
i∈N
i,k
N(k)i 〈`i − `k, pk〉 .
(A.1) follows from the fact that action k is optimal under pk. Clearly the term i = k can be omitted in the
last equality.
Proof of Lemma 18. We only prove the first inequality, the other one is symmetric. Assume first that A
is deterministic, that is, It : Σt−1 → N, and so It(h1:t−1) denotes the choice of the algorithm at time
step t, given that the (random) history of observations of length t − 1, H1:t−1 = (H1, . . . ,Ht−1) takes
h1:t−1 = (h1, . . . , ht−1) ∈ Σt−1. (Note that this is a slightly different history definition than H1:t−1 defined in
Section 5.1, as H1:t−1 does not include the actions since their choices are determined by the feedback any-
way. In general,H1:t−1 is equivalent to H1:t−1 ∪ (I1, ..., It−1). Nevertheless, if it is assumed that the feedback
symbol sets of actions are disjoint then H1:t−1 andH1:t−1 are equivalent.) We denote by p∗k the joint distribu-
tion of H1:T−1 over ΣT−1 associated with pk. (For games with only all-revealing actions, assuming hi, j = j
in H, p∗k is the product distribution over the outcome sequences, that is, formally, p
∗
k( j1:T−1) =
∏T−1
t=1 pk( jt).)
We can bound the difference N(2)2 − N(1)2 as
N(2)i − N(1)i =
T∑
t=1
(Pr2[It = i] − Pr1[It = i])
=
∑
h1:T−1∈ΣT−1
T∑
t=1
(
I (It(h1:t−1) = i) p∗2(h1:T−1) − I (It(h1:t−1) = i) p∗1(h1:T−1)
)
=
∑
h1:T−1∈ΣT−1
(
p∗2(h1:T−1) − p∗1(h1:T−1)
)
·
T∑
t=1
I (It(h1:t−1) = i)
≤ T
∑
h1:T−1∈ΣT−1
p∗2(h1:T−1)≥p∗1(h1:T−1)
(
p∗2(h1:T−1) − p∗1(h1:T−1)
)
(A.2)
=
T
2
∥∥∥p∗2 − p∗1∥∥∥1
≤ T
√
D(p∗2 ‖ p∗1)/2 ,
where the last step is an application of Pinsker’s inequality [24, Lemma 12.6.1] to distributions p∗1 and p
∗
2.
Using the chain rule for KL divergence [24, Theorem 2.5.3] we can write (with somewhat sloppy notation)
D(p∗2 ‖ p∗1) =
T−1∑
t=1
D
(
p∗2(ht | h1:t−1) ‖ p∗1(ht | h1:t−1)
)
,
Classification of finite partial-mon. games (Thursday 25th October, 2018 @ 22:29) 27
where the tth conditional KL divergence term is∑
h1:t−1∈Σt−1
Pr2(H1:t−1 = h1:t−1)
∑
ht∈Σ
Pr2(Ht = ht | H1:t−1 = h1:t−1) ln Pr2(Ht = ht | H1:t−1 = h1:t−1)Pr1(Ht = ht | H1:t−1 = h1:t−1) . (A.3)
Decompose this sum for the case It(h1:t−1) < R and It(h1:t−1) ∈ R. In the first case, we play a none-revealing
action, thus our observation Ht = hIt(h1:t−1),Jt = hIt(h1:t−1),1 is a deterministic constant in both models 1 and 2,
thus both Pr1(· | H1:t−1 = h1:t−1) and Pr2(· | H1:t−1 = h1:t−1) are degenerate and the KL divergence factor is
0. Otherwise, playing a revealing action, Ht= hIt(h1:t−1),Jt is the same deterministic function of Jt (which is
independent of H1:t−1) in both models 1 and 2, and so the inner sum in (A.3) is∑
ht∈Σ
Pr2[hIt(h1:t−1),Jt = ht] ln
Pr2[hIt(h1:t−1),Jt = ht]
Pr1[hIt(h1:t−1),Jt = ht]
. (A.4)
Since Prk[hIt(h1:t−1),Jt = ht] =
∑
jt∈M:hIt (h1:t−1), jt =ht pk( jt) (k = 1,2), using the log sum inequality [24, Theorem
2.7.1]), (A.4) is upper bounded by∑
ht∈Σ
∑
jt∈M:hIt (h1:t−1), jt =ht
p2( jt) ln
p2( jt)
p1( jt)
=
∑
jt∈M
p2( jt) ln
p2( jt)
p1( jt)
= D(p2 ‖ p1) .
Hence, D(p∗2 ‖ p∗1) is upper bounded by
T−1∑
t=1
∑
h1:t−1∈Σt−1
It(h1:t−1)∈R
Pr2(H1:t−1 = h1:t−1)D(p2 ‖ p1) = D(p2 ‖ p1)
T−1∑
t=1
∑
i∈R
Pr2[It = i] = D(p2 ‖ p1)N(2,T−1)rev ,
where N(k,T−1)rev =
∑T−1
t=1 Prk[It ∈ R]. This together with (A.2) gives N(2)i − N(1)i ≤ T
√
D(p2 ‖ p1)N(2,T−1)rev /2.
If A is random and its internal random “bits” are represented by a random value Z (which is independent
of J1,J2,. . . ), then N
(k)
i = E
[
N˜(k)i (Z)
]
for N˜(k)i (Z) =
∑T
t=1 Prk[It = i|Z]. Also let N˜(k,T−1)rev (Z) =
∑T−1
t=1 Prk[It ∈
R|Z]. The proof above implies that for any fixed z ∈ Range(Z),
N˜(2)i (z) − N˜(1)i (z) ≤ T
√
D(p2 ‖ p1)N˜(2,T−1)rev (z)/2 ,
and thus, using also Jensen’s inequality,
N(2)i − N(1)i = E
[
N˜(2)i (Z) − N˜(1)i (Z)
]
≤ E
[
T
√
D(p2 ‖ p1)N˜(2,T−1)rev (Z)/2
]
≤ T
√
D(p2 ‖ p1) E
[
N˜(2,T−1)rev (Z)
]
/2 = T
√
D(p2 ‖ p1)N(2,T−1)rev /2 ,
that is clearly upper bounded by T
√
D(p2 ‖ p1)N(2)rev/2 yielding the statement of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 20. We prove the lemma by showing that for every algorithm A on game G there exists an
algorithm A′ on G′ such that for any outcome sequence, RT (A′,G′) ≤ RT (A,G) and vice versa. Recall that
the minimax regret of a game is
RT (G) = inf
A
sup
J1:T∈MT
RT (A,G) ,
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`·,2
`·,1
Revealing non-dominated action
Non-revealing degenerate action
1
2
3 4
Figure A.10: Degenerate non-revealing actions on the chain. The loss vector of action 2 is a convex combination of that of action
1 and 3. On the other hand, the loss vector of action 4 is component-wise lower bounded by that of action 3.
where
RT (A,G) = E
 T∑
t=1
`It ,Jt −mini∈N
T∑
t=1
`i,Jt
 ,
First we observe that the term E[mini∈N
∑T
t=1 `i,Jt ] does not change by removing degenerate actions. Indeed,
by the definition of degenerate action, if the minimum is given by a degenerate action then there exists a
non-degenerate action with the same cumulative loss. It follows that we only have to deal with the term
E[
∑T
t=1 `It ,Jt ].
1. Let A′ be an algorithm on G′. We define the algorithm A on G by choosing the same actions as A′ at
every time step. Since the action set of G is a superset of that of G′, this construction results in a well
defined algorithm on G, and trivially has the same expected loss as A′.
2. Let A be an algorithm on G. From the definition of degenerate actions, we know that for every
degenerate action i, there are two possibilities:
(a) There exists a non-degenerate action i1 such that `i is component-wise lower bounded by `i1 .
(b) There are two non-degenerate actions i1 and i2 such that `i is a convex combination of `i1 and
`i2 , that is, `i = αi`i1 + (1 − αi)`i2 for some αi ∈ (0, 1).
An illustration of these cases can be found in Figure A.10. We construct A′ the following way. At
every time step t, if IAt (the action that algorithm A would take) is non-degenerate then let I
A′
t = I
A
t .
If IAt = i is a degenerate action of the first kind, let I
A′
t be i1. If I
A
t = i is a degenerate action of
the second kind then let IA
′
t be i1 with probability αi and i2 with probability 1 − αi. Recall that G is
non-degenerate, so i has to be a non-revealing action. However, i1 and/or i2 might be revealing ones.
To handle this, A′ is defined to map the observation sequence, before using it as the argument of It,
replacing the feedbacks corresponding to degenerate action i by hi,1 = hi,2. That is, intuitively, A′
“pretends” that the feedbacks at such time steps are irrelevant. It is clear that the expected loss of A′
in every time step is less than or equal to the expected loss of A, concluding the proof.
Proof of Theorem 13 for adversarial nature
For the proof, we start with a lemma, which ensures the existence of a pair i1,i2 of actions and an
outcome distribution p with M atoms such that both i1 and i2 are optimal under p.
Lemma 22. Let G = (L,H) be any finite non-trivial game with N actions and M ≥ 2 outcomes. Then there
exists p ∈ ∆M satisfying both of the following properties:
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(a) All coordinates of p are positive.
(b) There exist actions i1,i2 ∈ N such that `i1 , `i2 and for all i ∈ N,
〈`i1 , p〉 = 〈`i2 , p〉 ≤ 〈`i, p〉 .
Proof of Lemma 22. Note that distributions p with positive coordinates form the interior of ∆M (int ∆M).
For any action i ∈ N, as in the proof of Lemma 14, consider the compact convex cell Ci in ∆M, whose
union is ∆M (see (4)). Let p1 be any point in the interior of ∆M. By (4), there is a cell Ci1 containing p1.
If Ci1 = ∆M held then action i1 would satisfy Lemma 3 c), thus also d), and the game would be trivial. So
there must be a point, say p2, in ∆M \ Ci1 . The intersection of the closed segment p1 p2 and Ci1 is closed
and convex, thus it is a closed subsegment p1 p for some p ∈ Ci1 (p , p2). p1 ∈ int ∆M and the convexity of
∆M imply p ∈ int ∆M. Since the open segment pp2 has to be covered by ⋃i′:Ci′,Ci1 Ci′ , that is a closed set,
p ∈ ⋃i:Ci′,Ci1 Ci′ must also hold, that is, p ∈ Ci2 for some Ci2 , Ci1 (requiring `i1 , `i2). Hence p satisfies
both (a) and (b).
Proof of Theorem 13. When M = 1, G is always trivial, thus we assume that M ≥ 2. Without loss of
generality we may assume that all the actions are all-revealing.
Let p ∈ ∆M be a distribution of the outcomes that satisfies conditions (a) and (b) of Lemma 22. By
renaming actions we can assume without loss of generality that `1 , `2 and actions 1 and 2 are optimal
under p, that is,
〈`1, p〉 = 〈`2, p〉 ≤ 〈`i, p〉 (A.5)
for any i ∈ N.
Fix any learning algorithm A. We use randomization replacing the outcomes by a sequence J1, J2, . . . , JT
of random variables i.i.d. according to p, and independent of the internal randomization of A. Clearly, as in
the proof of Lemma 17, the worst-case expected regret of A is at least its average regret:
R¯T (A,G) ≥ E[RT (A,G)] = E
 T∑
t=1
`It ,Jt −mini∈N
T∑
t=1
`i,Jt
 = E
 T∑
t=1
E[`It ,Jt | It] −mini∈N
T∑
t=1
`i,Jt
 . (A.6)
Here, in the last two expressions, the expectation is with respect to both the internal randomization of A and
the random choice of J1, J2, . . . , JT . Now, since Jt is independent of It, we see that E[`It ,Jt | It] = 〈`It , p〉.
By (A.5), we have 〈`It , p〉 ≥ 〈`1, p〉 = 〈`2, p〉. Therefore (upper bounding also the minimum),
T∑
t=1
E
[
`It ,Jt | It
] −min
i∈N
T∑
t=1
`i,Jt =
T∑
t=1
〈`It , p〉 −mini∈N
T∑
t=1
`i,Jt
≥
T∑
t=1
〈`1, p〉 − min
i=1,2
T∑
t=1
`i,Jt (A.7)
= max
i=1,2
T∑
t=1
(〈`1, p〉 − `i,Jt) .
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Using the identity max{a, b} = 12 (a + b + |a − b|), the latest expression is
1
2
 T∑
t=1
(〈`1, p〉 − `1,Jt) + T∑
t=1
(〈`1, p〉 − `2,Jt) +
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
(〈`1, p〉 − `1,Jt) − T∑
t=1
(〈`1, p〉 − `2,Jt)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣

=
1
2
T∑
t=1
(〈`1, p〉 − `1,Jt + 〈`2, p〉 − `2,Jt) + 12
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
(
`2,Jt − `1,Jt
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where (A.5) was used in the first term. The expectation of the first term vanishes since E[`i,Jt ] = 〈`i, p〉. Let
Xt = `2,Jt − `1,Jt . We see that X1, X2, . . . , XT are i.i.d. random variables with mean E[Xt] = 0. Therefore,
E
maxi=1,2
T∑
t=1
(〈`1, p〉 − `i,Jt)
 = 12 E
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
Xt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ c√T , (A.8)
where the last inequality follows from Theorem 23 stated below and the constant c depends only on `1, `2,
and p. For the theorem to yield c > 0, it is important to note that the distribution of Xt has finite support and
with positive probability Xt , 0 since `1 , `2 and all coordinates of p are positive. Hence, both E[X2t ] and
E[X4t ] are finite and positive.
Now, putting together (A.6), (A.7), and (A.8) gives the desired lower bound R¯T (A,G) ≥ c
√
T . Since c
depends only on L, also RT (G) ≥ c
√
T .
The following theorem is a variant of Khinchine’s inequality (see e.g. [20, Lemma A.9]) for asymmetric
random variables. The idea of the proof is the same as there and originally comes from Littlewood [25].
Theorem 23 (Khinchine’s inequality for asymmetric random variables). Let X1, X2, . . . , XT be i.i.d. random
variables with mean E[Xt] = 0, finite variance E[X2t ] = Var(Xt) = σ2, and finite fourth moment E[X4t ] = µ4.
Then,
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
Xt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ σ3√3µ4
√
T .
Proof. [26, Lemma A.4] implies that for any random variable Z with finite fourth moment
E |Z| ≥
(
E[Z2]
)3/2
(
E[Z4]
)1/2 .
Applying this inequality to Z =
∑T
t=1 Xt we get
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
Xt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ T 3/2σ3T √3µ4 = σ
3√
3µ4
√
T ,
that follows from
E[Z2] = E

 T∑
t=1
Xt

2 = T∑
t=1
E[X2t ] = Tσ
2
and
E[Z4] = E

 T∑
t=1
Xt

4 = T∑
t=1
E[X4t ] + 6
∑
1≤s<t≤T
E[X2s ] E[X
2
t ] = Tµ4 + 3T (T − 1)σ4 ≤ 3T 2µ4,
where we have used the independence of Xt’s and E[Xt] = 0 which ensure that mixed terms E[XtXs],
E[XtX3s ], etc. vanish. We also used that σ4 = E[X2t ]2 ≤ E[X4t ] = µ4.
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